Abstract : Asymmetry of information is the information gap between management and owners of the company can be reduced in order to
found that the size and independence of the board of commissioners with their ability to monitor the financial reporting process.
The Quality of Financial Reporting
Issues relating to the quality of financial reporting is often caused by a conflict of interest between management and stakeholder interests. Management does not always act in the interests of stakeholders, but often management acts to maximize their welfare and securing their positions regardless of the danger posed to other stakeholders, such as employees, investors, creditors and the public. The importance of the differences then this raises the asymmetry of information between the two sides. Information gap between the company and potential investors, will also increase the probability for the company to increase profits and this can not detected by the market. (Ball Ray,et al,1968; Penman,2002; Boediono,2005; Fala,2007) . Research by Richardson (1998) proved that the higher the information the higher the income management so as to reduce the quality of earnings information. Earnings information used as a basis for decision making for the company's internal and external, then the earnings information can be referred to as a quality earnings information because it can affect the decisions that will be made for the parties concerned Dechow,1996; Feltham,1996; Gabrielsen,1997; Schipper,2003 . Earnings quality in this case that, if the income can provide a response to the interested parties in decision-making about the condition of the company.
Good Corporate Governance
Good Corporate Governance (GCG) is a key element in improving economic efficiency, which includes a set of relationships between the company's management, board, shareholders and other stakeholders Chtourou,2001; Brown,2004; Bahaudin,2011 . Corporate governance also provides a structure that facilitates the determination of the objectives of a company, and as a means to determine the performance monitoring techniques (Dean et al, 2004) . Based on the description above, it can be formulated as the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: asymmetry affects the quality of earnings, Hypothesis 2: managerial ownership of information can moderate the asymmetry between the quality of earnings. Hypothesis 3:
composition of independent directors can moderate the asymmetry of information between the quality of earnings.
Research Methodology
Location and Design of the research was conducted at the Indonesian Stock Exchange. By analyzing empirically the influence of asymmetry of information on the quality of earnings accrued by good corporate governance as a moderating variable. This study uses panel data (pooled data). The population in this study are listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 2009-2011. Of 168 manufacturing companies listed on the Stock Exchange, several companies had to be removed because of problems related to the availability, condition, and completeness of the information required in testing so the final sample to 24 firms. Data collection methods used in the form of data files or secondary data obtained from the annual financial statements of companies listed on the Stock Exchange and are available at (http://www.idx.co.id/) and the Indonesian capital market directory (ICMD) in 2009 -2011. Analysis of the data using two models, the first model to examine the effect of information asymmetry on earnings quality through multiple regression analysis (multiple linear regression) and the second model to test the effect of information asymmetry after moderated by good corporate governance (GCG) which consists of managerial ownership and the composition of independent directors. by using different test t-test. Using SPSS 17.0 for Windows. The results in the form of descriptive statistical analysis and hypothesis testing techniques.
III. Research Finding and Discussion

Research Findings
Descriptive Statistical Analysis
Based on the results of a descriptive analysis of Table 1 and 2 shows that the number of samples (n) of the study there were 24. Of the number of samples (n), the discretionary accruals variable has a minimum value and a maximum -0.5.09 -11. With an average standard deviation of 1.04801-2.6421dan. As well as the number of observations as much as 72. This shows a sample enterprise data quality tends to show quality of the profit.
Information asymmetry has a minimum value of 4:03 and a maximum value of 8.99 with an average of 5.9252 and a standard deviation of 1.20967 72 as well as the number of observations. This shows sample data company, has a fairly high information asymmetry. Managerial ownership has a minimum value and a maximum value of 23.0800 0.0010 with an average of 3.189972 and the standard deviation of 5.7944661. As well as the number of observations as much as 72. This means that stock ownership by management and directors of the average taken 10 percent. independen of board director has a minimum value and a maximum value of 0.2500 with an average of 60.0000 37.895556 and standard deviation of 9.8154470. As well as the number of observations as much as 72. This means that the number of independen board directors appointed by the parties outside the company more than 25 percent of its commissioners. 
Tabel 1. Details of Sampling Data
Multiple Regression Analysis
Based on Table 3 and Table 4 , it can be seen the coefficient of determination for moderation in the adjusted R square value is equal to 0.122 means that variations in the quality of earnings is the dependent variable can be explained by variation in the independent variable by 12% and the remaining 88% is explained by other variables. Once the data is entered moderating variable of good corporate governance, the adjusted R square value increased to 0.193 means that earnings quality variations dependent variable that can be explained by the independent variables by 19% and the remaining 89% is explained by other variables. 
Tabel 3. Coefficient of Determination Before Moderation
T-Test Results
Based on a statistical test t can be seen in Table 5 asymmetry variable has a negative and significant relationship to the quality of earnings. And when moderated by managerial ownership and composition of independent directors has a significant connection. 
Tabel 5. Result of statistical test (t)
IV. Discussion
Asymmetry Affects the Quality of Earnings
This study suggests that information asymmetry has effect significant negative on the quality of earnings. The statistical results showed that the variables significantly the second hypothesis (H1) which states that information asymmetry affects the quality of earnings, is acceptable. Substantial regression of variable asymmetry coefficient is negative indicates that there is a negative relationship between the value of information asymmetry discreationary accrual, where the greater the higher the value of the information asymmetry, discreationary accrual will be smaller, and vice versa. Results of this study are consistent with results of previous studies (Richardson, 1998) which found that there is a systematic relationship between magnitut information asymmetry and the level of earnings management Lafond,2006 . So the quality of the resulting profit associated with the level of earnings management undertaken by management. Information gap between the two sides, it will be able to lead to the use of accounting methods which can improve the bottom line. And will also be able to trigger high earnings management undertaken by the manager, so it can rise to the misleading information to users of financial statements.
Managerial Ownership of Information Can Moderate the Asymmetry between the Quality of Earnings
Managerial ownership may moderate the relationship asymmetry of information on the quality of the earnings accrual, the second hypothesis (H2) is acceptable. The results support the research by Jensen et al, 1976; Jones,1991; Merchan,1994; Warfield,1995; Xie,2003 . Theoretically when managerial ownership is high, then the incentive to the possibility of opportunistic behavior of managers will decline. With higher agency problems of managerial ownership is assumed to be on the wane. Fidyati (2004) find evidence that earnings management is conducted has a negative relationship with managerial ownership. This means that the higher the shares owned by management, the higher the quality of earnings. Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006) states that the greater the discretionary accrualsemakin managerial ownership is low Xiong,2006; Pagalung,Gagaring,2006 .
The results support the evidence that managerial ownership reduces the urge managers opportunistic behavior.
Composition of Independent Directors Can Moderate the Asymmetry of Information between the Qualities of Earnings
Composition of independent board directors are able to moderate the relationship between information asymmetry on the quality of that accrual earnings. The third hypothesis (H3) is acceptable. The role of the board of commissioners will have an impact on earnings management because the commissioners oversee the balancing of the interests of management that earnings management is not going to happen Morck,1988; Lins,2004 . Commissioners can also impact the performance of the company as if the commissioners carry out their duties properly, it can increase the confidence of investors that they would receive a return on the funds they have invested. Results of this study support the results of research conducted by Brown et al (2004) that examined the relationship between the proportion of the board of commissioners with the company's performance in generating earnings quality and found that companies with a high commissioners will have a return on equity yield, profit margin and dividend higher yields Veronica N.P. Siregar,2005;Indrayati,2010.
V.
Conclusion and Recommedations
Based on the findings in this study that specifically examined the manufacturing company that, the result that information asymmetry significant effect on earnings quality. Managerial ownership and the moderating variable composition of independent board directors is a variable that may moderate the relationship between information asymmetry with accrual earnings quality.
Advisable for the practitioner, or the management as the decision maker needs to put quality information generated company profits. Because earnings information will be used as a basis for decision making for interested parties (stakeholders). Besides, the implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) should also be considered optimal, in order to achieve corporate governance better.
